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Uniform infinite bases are defined for the single-conclusion and multiple-conclusion
admissible rules of the implication–negation fragments of intuitionistic logic IPC and its
consistent axiomatic extensions (intermediate logics). A Kripke semantics characterization
is given for the (hereditarily) structurally complete implication–negation fragments of
intermediate logics, and it is shown that the admissible rules of this fragment of IPC form
a PSPACE-complete set and have no finite basis.
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1. Introduction
Following Lorenzen [17], a rule is said to be admissible for a logic (understood as a finitary structural consequence relation)
if it can be added to a proof system for the logic without producing any new theorems.While the admissible rules of classical
propositional logic CPC are also derivable – that is, CPC is structurally complete – this is not the case for non-classical (modal,
many-valued, substructural, intermediate) logics in general (see, e.g., [26,22,4]). In particular, the study of admissible rules
was stimulated by the discovery of admissible but underivable rules of intuitionistic propositional logic IPC such as the
independence of premises rule:
¬p → (q ∨ r) / (¬p → q) ∨ (¬p → r).
The decidability of the set of admissible rules of IPC, posed as an open problem by Friedman in [6], was answered positively
by Rybakov, who demonstrated also that this set has no finite basis (understood as a set of admissible rules that added to
IPC produces all admissible rules) [26]. Nevertheless, following a conjecture by de Jongh and Visser, Iemhoff [9] and Rozière
[25] established independently that an infinite basis is formed by the family of ‘‘Visser rules’’ (n = 2, 3, . . .):
n
i=1
(qi → pi)→ (qn+1 ∨ qn+2)

∨ r

n+2
j=1

n
i=1
(qi → pi)→ qj

∨ r.
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More generally, the work of Rybakov [26] and Ghilardi [7,8] has led to a reasonably comprehensive understanding
of structural completeness and admissible rules for broad classes of intermediate and modal logics. Kripke frame based
characterizations of hereditarily structurally complete (i.e., each extension of the logic is structurally complete) intermediate
logics and transitive modal logics have been obtained by Citkin and Rybakov [5,26]. Bases have been provided for certain
intermediate logics by Iemhoff [10] and for transitive modal logics by Jeřábek [13], and Gentzen-style proof systems have
been developed for these logics by Iemhoff and Metcalfe [11,12]. Note, moreover, that in these cases, admissibility is
characterized in the wider setting of multiple-conclusion rules, where, as the name suggests, many conclusions as well
as many premises are permitted. A paradigmatic example of a multiple-conclusion rule admissible in intuitionistic logic but
not classical logic is the disjunction property, which may be formulated as
p ∨ q / p, q.
For other families of non-classical logics, much less is known, but structural completeness for substructural logics has been
investigated by Olson et al. [22] and for fuzzy logics by the current authors [4], and bases have been provided for the
(multiple-conclusion) admissible rules of Łukasiewicz logics by Jeřábek [14,15] and the logic R-Mingle by Metcalfe [19].
Hereditary structural completeness for the implicational fragment of IPC was established by Prucnal [23], and the
same proof method extends to the implication–conjunction and implication–conjunction–negation fragments [20]. Mints
demonstrated hereditary structural completeness for implicationless fragments of IPC and showed moreover that any
admissible underivable rule of IPC must contain both implication and disjunction [21]. Curiously, however, as observed
by Wroński [28], the implication–negation fragment (equivalently, the implication–falsity fragment) – the logic of bounded
BCKW-algebras – is not structurally complete. Consider, e.g., the following rule:
((¬¬p → p)→ r), ((¬¬q → q)→ r), (p → ¬q) / r.
This rule is not derivable in IPC and therefore not in any of its fragments. The rule is also not admissible in IPC. However, it
is admissible in the implication–negation fragment of this logic.
Hence the questions arise: Do there exist other admissible underivable rules for this fragment of a similar or quite
different form? Do these admissible rules admit an elegant finite or infinite basis? Do they form a decidable set and if so,
what is its complexity? What is the unification type of this fragment? This paper answers these questions as follows:
• Elegant bases consisting of uniform infinite sequences of rules, similar toWroński’s example, are provided for the single-
conclusion andmultiple-conclusion admissible rules of the implication–negation fragment not only of IPC but also of any
intermediate logic (Theorems 3.5 and 3.6).
• The admissible rules of this fragment of IPC are shown to form a PSPACE-complete set (Theorem 4.3).
• A Kripke frame characterization is given of the (hereditarily) structurally complete intermediate logics with respect to
the implication–negation fragment (Theorem 5.3) and used to show the lack of a finite basis for this fragment of IPC
(Theorem 5.5).
• It is shown that the unification type of the implication–negation fragment of any intermediate logic properly included in
classical logic is finitary and not unitary (Theorem 6.1).
2. Preliminaries
We begin by fixing some basic notation and definitions, in particular, for dealing with multiple-conclusion and single-
conclusion consequence relations, derivable and admissible rules, and, crucially, the concept of projectivity for a logic.
2.1. Consequence relations
The notions of a propositional language L (a set of connectives with specified finite arities) and set of L-formulas FmL
over a fixed countably infinite set of variables p, q, r, . . . are defined as usual, denoting formulas by ϕ,ψ, χ and finite sets
of formulas by Γ ,∆,Π,Σ . An L-substitution σ is then an endomorphism on the formula algebra FmL, writing σ(Γ ) for
{σϕ | ϕ ∈ Γ }.
A rule for L is an ordered pair (Γ ,∆), written as Γ / ∆, where Γ ∪ ∆ is a finite subset of FmL, called single-conclusion
if |∆| = 1 and multiple-conclusion in general. We write ‘Γ / ϕ’, ‘Γ ,∆’, and ‘Γ , ϕ’ for, respectively, ‘Γ / {ϕ}’, ‘Γ ∪ ∆’, and
‘Γ ∪ {ϕ}’. A (finitary structural) multiple-conclusion consequence relation on FmL, orm-logic for short, is then a set L of rules
(writing Γ ⊢L ∆ instead of (Γ ,∆) ∈ L) satisfying for all finite subsets Γ ,Γ ′,∆,∆′ of FmL and formulas ϕ ∈ FmL:
1. ϕ ⊢L ϕ,
2. if Γ ⊢L ∆, then Γ ,Γ ′ ⊢L ∆′,∆,
3. if Γ , ϕ ⊢L ∆, and Γ ′ ⊢L ϕ,∆′, then Γ ,Γ ′ ⊢L ∆′,∆,
4. if Γ ⊢L ∆, then σ(Γ ) ⊢L σ(∆) for eachL-substitution σ .
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A (finitary structural) consequence relation, or logic for short, is a set L of single-conclusion rules satisfying (the corresponding
single-conclusion variants of) parts 1–4 of the definition of m-logic.1 A theorem of an (m-)logic L is a formula ϕ such that
∅ ⊢L ϕ (abbreviated as ⊢L ϕ).
In this paper, our primary interest lies with logics not m-logics, the latter being essentially a technical tool useful for
simplifying proofs and obtaining more uniform presentations. Nevertheless, it will be helpful to think of each logic L as
determining an m-logic:
Lm = {Γ /∆ | (∃ϕ ∈ ∆)(Γ ⊢L ϕ)}.
Clearly Lm is an m-logic. Let us also define the single-conclusion fragment of an m-logic L as
Ls = {(Γ /∆) ∈ L | |∆| = 1}.
Then (Lm)s is L. On the other hand, for an m-logic L, in general (Ls)m ≠ L. Consider, e.g., an m-logic L defined by Γ ⊢L ∆ iff
Γ ⊢CPC ∆. Then ⊢L {p,¬p}, but ⊢(Ls)m {p,¬p} iff ⊢Ls p or ⊢Ls ¬p, i.e., iff ⊢CPC p or ⊢CPC ¬p, which does not hold.
2.2. Derivable and admissible rules
A rule Γ / ∆ is said to be derivable in a logic or m-logic L if Γ ⊢L ∆, and admissible in L, written Γ |∼L∆, if for each
substitution σ : whenever ⊢L σϕ for all ϕ ∈ Γ , also ⊢L σψ for some ψ ∈ ∆. Observe that |∼L is itself an m-logic, even in
the case where L is a logic.
Example 2.1. Although single-conclusion rules are usually of greater interest, multiple-conclusion rules can be useful for
expressing important properties of logics. For example, the disjunction property can be formulated as p ∨ q / p, q. Observe
that this rule is IPC-admissible but not CPC-admissible: just consider the substitution σp = p and σq = ¬p.
A logic L is said to be structurally complete if all logics L′ ⊇ L in the same language have new theorems, and hereditarily
structurally complete if all logics L′ ⊇ L in the same language are structurally complete. It is easily proved (see, e.g., [22])
that a logic L is structurally complete if and only if L coincides with the single-conclusion fragment of |∼L . Examples of
(hereditarily) structurally complete logics include CPC, Gödel logic G, and the implicational fragment of IPC. More details,
including algebraic characterizations of these notions, may be found in [22,4].
For a logic L that is not structurally complete, we are interested in axiomatizing the admissible rules of L by adding a
suitable set of rules as a ‘‘basis’’. More generally, we define what it means for a set of rules to be a basis for one logic or m-
logic over another. Let L be an m-logic (logic) and B a set of (single-conclusion) rules. Then LB denotes the smallest m-logic
(logic) containing L ∪ B and B is called a basis for LB over L. In particular, our aim will be to find for a logic L: (a) a basis for
|∼L over Lm, and (b) a basis for ( |∼L )s over L.
2.3. Projectivity
Although a logic may not be structurally complete, there may be well-behaved sets of formulas such that for rules whose
premises form such a set, admissibility coincides with derivability. Let us fix L as a logic based on a languageL containing a
binary connective→ for whichmodus ponens is derivable (ϕ, ϕ → ψ ⊢L ψ). Generalizing Ghilardi [7,8] slightly, Γ ⊆ FmL
is called L-projective if there exists anL-substitution σ , called an L-projective unifier for Γ , such that (i) σ is an L-unifier for
Γ , namely ⊢L σϕ for all ϕ ∈ Γ , and (ii) Γ ⊢L σψ → ψ and Γ ⊢L ψ → σψ for all ψ ∈ FmL. (We also say that ϕ ∈ FmL is
L-projective if {ϕ} is L-projective to conform with Ghilardi’s definition.) Moreover, such a σ is also a most general L-unifier
for Γ in the sense that for any other L-unifier σ1 for Γ , there exists anL-substitution σ2 such that σ2σ = σ1.
Example 2.2. Notice that in IPC, any formula of the form p → ϕ or ϕ → p is IPC-projective, with corresponding IPC-
projective unifier σq = (p → ϕ)∧q or σq = (p → ϕ)→ q, respectively. On the other hand, formulas such as¬p → (q∨r)
and¬p ∨ ¬¬p are not IPC-projective.
Lemma 2.3. If Γ ⊆ FmL is L-projective, then: (i) Γ |∼L∆ iff Γ ⊢Lm ∆; (ii) Γ |∼L ϕ iff Γ ⊢L ϕ.
Proof. Notice that (ii) immediately follows from (i). For the right-to-left direction of (i), observe that if Γ ⊢Lm ∆, then
Γ ⊢L ϕ for some ϕ ∈ ∆. So σΓ ⊢L σϕ for any L-substitution σ , and if ⊢L σψ for each ψ ∈ Γ , then ⊢L σϕ. That is,
Γ |∼L∆. For the other direction, let σ be an L-projective unifier of Γ . If Γ |∼L∆, then ⊢L σψ for some ψ ∈ ∆. Since σ is an
L-projective unifier, Γ ⊢L σψ → ψ . Hence by modus ponens, Γ ⊢L ψ and we get Γ ⊢Lm ∆ as required. 
It can be checked, following [23], that for any intermediate logic L and finite set of implicational formulas {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn},
the substitution σp = ϕ1 → (ϕ2 → (· · · → (ϕn → p) · · · ) is an L-projective unifier. So by Lemma 2.3, the implicational
fragment of any intermediate logic is (hereditarily) structurally complete. This reasoning extends also to the implication–
conjunction and implication–conjunction–negation fragments [20], but may no longer hold for the full logic. In particular,
although any formula of the form p → ϕ is IPC-projective, in general, formulas such as ϕ ∨ψ are not, and indeed IPC is not
structurally complete. Most relevantly for the current paper, formulas of the form ¬ϕ are generally not projective for the
implication–negation fragment of IPC or many other intermediate logics.
1 We remark that this definition of a logic does not quite match the usual Tarski-style definition which allows the set of formulas Γ occurring in Γ ⊢L ϕ
to be infinite. Nevertheless, every finitary structural consequence relation in the usual sense determines a unique logic in our sense and vice versa.
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3. Bases for intermediate logics
For convenience, let us assume for the remainder of this paper that L is a consistent axiomatic extension of the
implication–negation fragment of intuitionistic logic IPC (ensuring, e.g., that L has the deduction theorem and is contained in
classical logic CPC). Note that our convention includes (but is not necessarily limited to) the implication–negation fragment
of any intermediate logic (axiomatic extension of IPC).2
The basic connectives of L are taken to be→ and ⊥, defining ¬ϕ =def ϕ → ⊥ and ⊤ =def ⊥ → ⊥. We abbreviate
ϕ1 → (ϕ2 → (· · · → (ϕn → ψ) · · · ) by ϕ1 → ϕ2 → · · · → ϕn → ψ or ϕ⃗ → ψ and, where appropriate, treat ϕ⃗ as a set
in our proofs, making no distinction syntactically between formulas with permuted antecedents (such as ϕ1 → ϕ2 → ψ
and ϕ2 → ϕ1 → ψ) or with multiple occurrences of the same antecedent (such as ϕ → ϕ⃗ → ϕ → ψ and ϕ → ϕ⃗ → ψ).
For ϕ⃗ = ∅, we understand ϕ⃗ → ψ to be the formula ψ . We use Γ ,Π,∆,Σ without further comment to denote finite sets
of formulas and p, q, r to denote propositional variables. Since by the Glivenko theorem and the fact that L is contained in
CPC, a set of formulas is L-consistent if and only if Γ ⊬CPC ⊥, we drop the prefix and speak just of consistency.
3.1. The Wroński rules
Bases for themultiple-conclusion and single-conclusion admissible rules of Lwill consist of sets of the following ‘‘Wroński
rules’’ (n ∈ N):
(Wn) (p⃗ →⊥) / (¬¬p1 → p1), . . . , (¬¬pn → pn)
(W ′n) (p⃗ →⊥), ((¬¬p1 → p1)→ q), . . . , ((¬¬pn → pn)→ q) / q.
Note that in the case of n = 0 (useful for technical reasons) (W0) is ⊥ / ∅ and is L-admissible but not L-derivable, and
(W ′0) is ⊥ / q and is both L-admissible and L-derivable. Note also that (W ′2) is the example of Wroński mentioned in the
introduction.
The single-conclusion rules (W ′n) for n ≥ 2 are not derivable in IPC (see Lemma 5.1) but are derivable in stronger inter-
mediate logics such as Gödel logic (IPC + (p → q)∨ (q → p)) and DeMorgan (Jankov) logic (IPC +¬p∨¬¬p). Nevertheless,
in all cases:
Lemma 3.1. (Wn) and (W ′n) are L-admissible for all n ∈ N.3
Proof. Suppose that ⊢L σ(p⃗ → ⊥), noting in particular that when n = 0, this is not possible. Then σpi must be of the
form ϕ⃗ → ⊥ for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}; otherwise, the substitution σ ′q = ⊤ for each variable q gives ⊢L σ ′σ(p⃗ → ⊥) and
therefore ⊢L ⊤→ ⊥, a contradiction. Hence, since ⊢L ¬¬(ϕ⃗ →⊥)→ (ϕ⃗ →⊥)we obtain: ⊢L σ(¬¬pi → pi). So (Wn) is
L-admissible. Moreover, since if ⊢L σ((¬¬pi → pi)→ q), then ⊢L σq, also (W ′n) is L-admissible. 
Observe on the other hand that these rules may not be admissible in fragments of an intermediate logic containing ∧
or ∨ as well as→ and ⊥. In particular, for IPC, let σp1 = p ∧ ¬q and σp2 = q. Then ⊢IPC σ(p1 → p2 → ⊥) but ⊬IPC
σ(¬¬p1 → p1) and ⊬IPC σ(¬¬p2 → p2).
3.2. A multiple-conclusion basis
We define the following set of multiple-conclusion Wroński rules:
W = {(Wn) | n ∈ N}.
Our aim is to show that Γ |∼L∆ implies Γ ⊢LWm ∆ (the reverse direction follows from Lemma 3.1). The first step of our
strategy will be to ‘‘reduce’’ the question of the admissibility of any rule to the admissibility of rules of a certain basic form.
Let us call a formula having one of the following forms simple:
(i) p⃗ →⊥,
(ii) ψ⃗ → r where each member of ψ⃗ is of the form p → q or p.
The next lemma formalizes this ‘‘reduction’’ idea; its proof is based on replacing non-simple formulas by formulas which
are, in a sense, ‘‘more simple’’.
Lemma 3.2. For any finite set of formulas Γ , there exists a finite set of simple formulasΠ such that for each finite set of formulas
∆:
1. Γ ⊢LWm ∆ iffΠ ⊢LWm ∆,
2. Γ |∼L∆ iffΠ |∼L∆.
2 This follows from the fact that any such fragment has the classical deduction theorem and an extension of the implication–negation fragment of IPC
has the classical deduction theorem iff it is an axiomatic extension (a folklore result; for an explicit formulation see, e.g., [3, Corollary 8]).
3 This statement holds more widely in fact, e.g., for the implication–negation fragment of any consistent axiomatic extension of the full Lambek calculus
with exchange and weakening FLew (equivalently, affine multiplicative additive intuitionistic linear logic or monoidal logic).
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Proof. Define the complexity of a formula ϕ to be the number of occurrences of→ and⊥ in ϕ, and letmc(Γ ) be themultiset
of complexities of the formulas occurring in Γ . We prove the claim by induction on mc(Γ ) using the standard multiset
ordering <m: the transitive closure of <1m defined for finite sets of natural numbers P,Q by P <
1
m Q iff P can be obtained
from Q by replacing an element x by y1, . . . , yn where yi < x for i = 1, . . . , n.
Suppose that there is a formula ϕ in Γ that is not simple. If ϕ is of the form⊥ → ψ (possibly permuting antecedents),
then we remove ϕ from Γ and the result follows using the induction hypothesis. Now suppose that ϕ is of the form
(ψ1 → ψ2)→ χ (possibly permuting antecedents) where either ψ1 or ψ2 is not a variable. We obtain a set of formulas Γ ′
withmc(Γ ′) <m mc(Γ ) by replacing ϕ with the formulas (p → q)→ χ , p → ψ1, andψ2 → qwhere p and q do not occur
in Γ , ϕ, or∆. The result follows from the induction hypothesis and the derivabilities:
(1) (p → q)→ χ, p → ψ1, ψ2 → q ⊢L (ψ1 → ψ2)→ χ ,
(2) Γ \ {(ψ1 → ψ2)→ χ}, (p → q)→ χ, p → ψ1, ψ2 → q ⊢LWm ∆.
Just note that since p and q are new variables, using (2), we obtainΓ , ψ1 → ψ1, ψ2 → ψ2 ⊢LWm ∆, i.e.,Γ ⊢LWm ∆ as required.
Finally, the only remaining possibility is that ϕ is of the form (p → q) → ψ⃗ → ⊥ (possibly permuting antecedents). We
obtain a set of formulasΓ ′ withmc(Γ ′) <m mc(Γ ) by replacing ϕwith the formulas q → ψ⃗ →⊥ and (p → q)→ ψ⃗ → p.
The result follows from the induction hypothesis and the derivabilities:
(3) q → ψ⃗ →⊥, (p → q)→ ψ⃗ → p ⊢L (p → q)→ ψ⃗ →⊥,
(4) (p → q)→ ψ⃗ →⊥ ⊢L q → ψ⃗ →⊥,
(5) (p → q)→ ψ⃗ →⊥ ⊢L (p → q)→ ψ⃗ → p. 
Hence to show that Γ |∼L∆ implies Γ ⊢LWm ∆, we can use this lemma to construct the finite set of simple formulas Π
such thatΠ |∼L∆ and it then suffices to show thatΠ ⊢LWm ∆. Our strategy will be to construct a finite set ΨΠ of finite sets
of formulas containing Π such that Π ⊢LWm ∆ whenever Π ′ ⊢Lm ∆ for all Π ′ ∈ ΨΠ , and then to reduce the admissibility
problem Π |∼L∆ to the derivability problem Π ′ ⊢Lm ∆ for all Π ′ ∈ ΨΠ . Roughly speaking, ΨΠ will contain all possible
applications of the rules fromW to formulas inΠ ; i.e., making use of the deduction theorem, we consider sets of variables
X such that
Π ∪ X ⊢L ⊥
and obtain new sets of formulas by adding for each such X a formula ¬¬p → p for some p ∈ X .
Let us elaborate these ideas in detail. By Var(Π)we denote the set of variables occurring inΠ . We enumerate the sets of
variables X ⊆ Var(Π) such thatΠ ∪ X ⊢L ⊥ as X1, . . . , Xn and define the following sequence:
1. Ψ0 = {∅},
2. Ψi = {Σ ∪ {¬¬p → p} | Σ ∈ Ψi−1 and p ∈ Xi} for i = 1, . . . , n.
Let ΨΠ = {Σ ∪Π | Σ ∈ Ψn}. Note that ifΠ is inconsistent, then Xi = ∅ for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and it follows that Ψj = ∅
for i ≤ j ≤ n, and so ΨΠ = ∅.
Lemma 3.3. LetΠ be a finite set of simple formulas. IfΠ ′ ⊢Lm ∆ for allΠ ′ ∈ ΨΠ , thenΠ ⊢LWm ∆.
Proof. Note as a special case that if Π is inconsistent, then the result follows immediately using the rule (W0). More
generally, we prove by induction on i = 0, . . . , n, that Π ′ ⊢LWm ∆ for all Π ′ ∈ {Σ ∪ Π | Σ ∈ Ψi} implies Π ⊢LWm ∆.
The base case is immediate. For the induction step suppose thatΠ ∪Σ ⊢LWm ∆ for allΣ ∈ Ψi. Consider someΣ ′ ∈ Ψi−1. By
construction,Π ⊢L Xi → ⊥ andΠ ∪Σ ′ ∪ {¬¬p → p} ⊢LWm ∆ for each p ∈ Xi. But Xi → ⊥ ⊢LWm {¬¬p → p | p ∈ Xi} is an
instance of a rule ofW . Hence by transitivity,Π ∪Σ ′ ⊢LWm ∆. So by the induction hypothesis,Π ⊢LWm ∆ as required. 
It remains then to show that Π ′ ⊢Lm ∆ for all Π ′ ∈ ΨΠ whenever Π |∼L∆ for any finite set of simple formulas Π .
The crucial step here will be to establish for each Π ′ ∈ ΨΠ that there exists an L-projective set of formulas ϕ⃗ such that
Π ⊆ ϕ⃗ ⊆ Π ′. It then follows that Π |∼L∆ (trivially) implies ϕ⃗ |∼L∆ and so by Lemma 2.3 we obtain ϕ⃗ ⊢Lm ∆ and hence
(trivially) alsoΠ ′ ⊢Lm ∆.
Lemma 3.4. LetΠ be a finite set of simple formulas. IfΠ |∼L∆, thenΠ ′ ⊢Lm ∆ for allΠ ′ ∈ ΨΠ .
Proof. As mentioned above, it suffices to show that for each Π ′ ∈ ΨΠ , there exists an L-projective set of formulas ϕ⃗ such
thatΠ ⊆ ϕ⃗ ⊆ Π ′. We first define the set of variables
X = {p ∈ Var(Π) | ¬¬p → p ∉ Π ′}.
If Π ∪ X ⊢L ⊥, then by construction ¬¬p → p ∈ Π ′ for some p ∈ X , a contradiction. Hence there exists a classical
evaluation e satisfyingΠ ∪ X . In particular, if e(p) = 0, then ¬¬p → p ∈ Π ′. We define the set of formulas
ϕ⃗ = Π ′ \ {¬¬p → p | e(p) = 1}.
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We also define the substitution
σp =

ϕ⃗ → p if e(p) = 1
(ϕ⃗ → p →⊥)→⊥ if e(p) = 0.
It remains then to check that σ is an L-projective unifier for ϕ⃗. For each variable pwe need
ϕ⃗ ⊢L σp → p and ϕ⃗ ⊢L p → σp.
The only tricky case is to show that ϕ⃗ ⊢L σp → p when e(p) = 0. Notice first that ϕ⃗ ⊢L ¬p → ϕ⃗ → ¬p. Hence also
ϕ⃗ ⊢L ((ϕ⃗ → p →⊥)→⊥)→ ¬¬p. But since e(p) = 0,¬¬p → p ∈ ϕ⃗. So ϕ⃗ ⊢L ((ϕ⃗ → p →⊥)→⊥)→ p as required.
Now we show that ⊢L σϕ for each ϕ ∈ ϕ⃗, considering all possibilities. First, if ϕ is of the form ¬¬p → p, then e(p) = 0
and we can use the fact that ⊢L ¬¬¬ψ → ¬ψ for ψ = ϕ⃗ → p → ⊥. Otherwise, ϕ is a simple formula from Π and so
e(ϕ) = 1. We distinguish two cases:
(1) ϕ is p⃗ → ⊥. Then e(p) = 0 for some p ∈ p⃗. Since ϕ⃗ ⊢L σq → q for each q ∈ p⃗, we get ϕ⃗ ⊢L σ p⃗ → p → ⊥. So by the
deduction theorem,
⊢L σ p⃗ → ϕ⃗ → p →⊥.
Hence also, since ⊢L χ → ¬¬χ for any formula χ ,
⊢L σ p⃗ → ((ϕ⃗ → p →⊥)→⊥)→⊥.
That is, ⊢L σ p⃗ → σp →⊥ as required.
(2) ϕ is ψ⃗ → p. If e(p) = 1, then σp = ϕ⃗ → p. Since ϕ⃗ ⊢L σψ → ψ for each ψ ∈ ψ⃗ , we obtain ϕ⃗ ⊢L σψ⃗ → p, and by
the deduction theorem, ⊢L σψ⃗ → σp as required. Otherwise, e(ψ) = 0 for some ψ ∈ ψ⃗ . Again, we distinguish two
options:
(i) ψ is q. Then ϕ⃗ ⊢L ψ⃗ → q → p, so using projectivity and the deduction theorem,
⊢L σψ⃗ → ϕ⃗ → q → σp.
But then also
⊢L σψ⃗ → ((ϕ⃗ → q →⊥)→⊥)→ ¬¬σp.
Since e(p) = 0, ⊢L ¬¬σp → σp, so as required
⊢L σψ⃗ → ((ϕ⃗ → q →⊥)→⊥)→ σp.
(ii) ψ is r → q. Then e(r) = 1 and e(q) = 0 and as before
⊢L ϕ⃗ → σψ⃗ → (r → q)→ σp.
But then
⊢L σψ⃗ → ¬σp → ϕ⃗ → ¬(r → q).
However, it can be checked that
⊢IPC (ϕ⃗ → ¬(r → q))→ ¬((ϕ⃗ → r)→ ((ϕ⃗ → q →⊥)→⊥)).
Hence, we obtain
⊢L σψ⃗ → ¬¬(σ r → σq)→ ¬¬σp,
and since ⊢L ¬¬σp → σp, we have ⊢L σψ⃗ → (σ r → σq)→ σp as required. 
Theorem 3.5. W is a basis for |∼L over Lm.
Proof. We show that Γ |∼L∆ iff Γ ⊢LWm ∆. One direction was established in Lemma 3.1. To prove the second, suppose
that Γ |∼L∆. By Lemma 3.2, we can construct a finite set of simple formulas Π such that Π |∼L∆. But then by Lemma 3.4,
Π ′ ⊢Lm ∆ for allΠ ′ ∈ ΨΠ . Hence by Lemma 3.3,Π ⊢LWm ∆ and Lemma 3.2 completes the proof that Γ ⊢LWm ∆. 
3.3. A single-conclusion basis
For single-conclusion rules, we define
W ′ = {(W ′n) | n ∈ N}.
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Theorem 3.6. W ′ is a basis for ( |∼L )s over L.
Proof. Suppose that Γ |∼L ϕ. As in the multiple-conclusion case, we may assume that Γ consists only of simple formulas.
Recall the construction above of X1, . . . , Xn and the sets of sets of formulas Ψ0, . . . ,Ψn. We prove Γ ⊢LW ′ ψ⃗ → ϕ for all
ψ⃗ ∈ Ψi for i = 0, . . . , n by induction on n − i. For the base case, note that by Lemma 3.4, Γ , ψ⃗ ⊢L ϕ for each ψ⃗ ∈ Ψn and
hence by the deduction theorem, Γ ⊢L ψ⃗ → ϕ. For the induction step, suppose that ψ⃗ ∈ Ψi−1. By the induction hypothesis,
for each p ∈ Xi,
Γ ⊢LW ′ (¬¬p → p)→ ψ⃗ → ϕ.
But byW ′, substituting ψ⃗ → ϕ for q,
(Xi →⊥), {(¬¬p → p)→ ψ⃗ → ϕ | p ∈ Xi} ⊢LW ′ ψ⃗ → ϕ.
Hence, since Γ ∪ Xi ⊢L ⊥ and by the deduction theorem, Γ ⊢L Xi →⊥,
Γ ⊢LW ′ ψ⃗ → ϕ.
So, finally, since Ψ0 = {∅}, Γ ⊢LW ′ ϕ as required. 
This result allows us to give the following characterization of the (hereditarily) structurally complete implication–
negation fragments of intermediate logics.
Theorem 3.7. L is (hereditarily) structurally complete if and only if W ′ ⊆ L.
Proof. If L is (hereditarily) structurally complete, then W ′ ⊆ L since each rule in W ′ is L-admissible and therefore also
L-derivable. For the other direction, suppose that W ′ ⊆ L. Then since W ′ is a basis for the admissible single-conclusion
rules of L, this logic and all of its axiomatic extensions are structurally complete. But if all axiomatic extensions of a logic are
structurally complete, then the logic is hereditarily structurally complete [22, Theorem 2.6]. 
4. Complexity
An analysis of our proofs also solves the complexity problem for the admissible rules of the implication–negation
fragment IPC→,¬ of intuitionistic logic. We define
F(Γ ) = {Y ⊆ Var(Γ ) | (∀X)(Γ , X ⊢L ⊥ ⇒ X ∩ Y ≠ ∅)}
Ψ ′Γ = {Γ ∪ {¬¬p → p | p ∈ Y } | Y ∈ F(Γ )}.
Lemma 4.1. Let Γ be a finite set of simple formulas. Then Γ |∼L∆ iffΠ ′ ⊢Lm ∆ for eachΠ ′ ∈ Ψ ′Γ .
Proof. Suppose first that Γ |∼L∆. Notice that for each Π ′ ∈ Ψ ′Γ there is a Π ∈ ΨΓ such that Π ′ ⊇ Π , so by Lemma 3.4,
Π ′ ⊢Lm ∆ for eachΠ ′ ∈ Ψ ′Γ . Since ΨΓ ⊆ Ψ ′Γ , the reverse direction follows by Lemma 3.3 and Theorem 3.5. 
Lemma 4.2. Let Γ be a finite set of simple formulas. Then deciding Π ∈ Ψ ′Γ is solvable in non-deterministic polynomial time
(with respect to the size of Γ ).
Proof. We show thatΠ = Γ ∪{¬¬p → p | p ∈ Y } ∈ Ψ ′Γ iffΓ ,Var(Γ )\Y ⊬L ⊥, which reduces the problem to satisfiability
in classical logic. From the construction of Ψ ′n we know that Π ∈ Ψ ′Γ iff Y ∈ F(Γ ). To complete the proof we show that
Y ∈ F(Γ ) iff Γ ,Var(Γ ) \ Y ⊬L ⊥. For the first direction, assume that Y ∈ F(Γ ). Since (Var(Γ ) \ Y ) ∩ Y = ∅, we obtain
Γ ,Var(Γ ) \ Y ⊬L ⊥. For the converse direction, assume that Γ ,Var(Γ ) \ Y ⊬L ⊥ and Γ , X ⊢L ⊥. Then X ⊈ Var(Γ ) \ Y .
That is, X ∩ Y ≠ ∅. 
Theorem 4.3. The set of admissible rules of IPC→,¬ is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. PSPACE-hardness follows from the fact that the set of theorems for this fragment of IPC is already PSPACE-hard [27].
Next, observe that Lemma 3.2 reduces the problem to the problem of checking the IPC→,¬-admissibility of rules with a
simple set of premises. This reduction is clearly polynomial (by inspection of the proof). To solve this problem we use the
contrapositive version of Lemma 4.1. Consider a rule Γ / ∆ with simple premises. First we observe that allΠ ∈ Ψ ′Γ are of
polynomial size with respect to Γ . Thus, to show that Γ /∆ is not IPC→,¬-admissible we can non-deterministically guess
some X ⊆ Var(Γ ) and ϕ ∈ ∆ and check whetherΠ = Γ , {¬¬p → p | p ∈ X} ∈ Ψ ′Γ and the IPC-non-derivability ofΠ / ϕ,
a problem in PSPACE. Finally, we use the fact that coNPSPACE= PSPACE. 
Clearly, a similar analysis can be used to obtain complexity bounds for the admissible rules of other intermediate logics
when bounds are known already for the derivability problem. We remark moreover that although in the case of IPC→,¬
the complexity of admissibility matches the complexity of derivability, this is not always the case. Indeed, in contrast to the
PSPACE-completeness of derivability, admissibility in full intuitionistic logic is co-NEXP-complete [16].
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5. Kripke frames
We refer the reader to [2] for standard definitions and further details regarding Kripke frames and models for
intermediate logics. In particular, recall that a frame is Church–Rosser if every finite set of elements with a lower bound
also has an upper bound. Weakening this condition, let us call a frame n-almost-Church–Rosser (n-aCR) if each set of at most
n non-maximal elements which has a lower bound also has an upper bound. A frame F is called almost-Church–Rosser (aCR)
if it is n-aCR for all n ∈ N.
Lemma 5.1. (W ′n) is valid in a frame F iff F is n-aCR (n = 2, 3, . . .).
Proof. First suppose that the frame F = (X,≤) is not n-aCR. Then there exists some set Y = {x1, . . . , xm} ⊆ X (m ≤ n) of
non-maximal elements with a lower bound z but no upper bound. We show that (W ′m) is not valid in F and thus also (W ′n)
is not valid in F . For each i ≤ m we define x |= pi iff x > xi. Since Y has no upper bound, x |̸= mi=1 pi for each x ∈ X , and
hence also z |= ¬mi=1 pi. Moreover, since xi is non-maximal and x |= pi for all x > xi, we have x |̸= ¬pi for all x ≥ xi
for i = 1, . . . ,m. Hence also xi |= ¬¬pi for i = 1, . . . ,m. But then xi |̸= ¬¬pi → pi and thus also z |̸= ¬¬pi → pi for
i = 1, . . . ,m. Finally, we define x |= q iff x ≠ z and obtain z |= (¬¬pi → pi) → q for i = 1, . . . ,m which completes the
proof.
For the opposite direction, suppose that F = (X,≤) is n-aCR but (W ′n) is not valid in F . Then there is an evaluation |= and
a world z such that:
1. z |̸= q,
2. z |= ¬i≤n pi,
3. z |= (¬¬pi → pi)→ q for i = 1, . . . , n.
From the last condition we obtain that for each i = 1, . . . , n there is a world xi ≥ z such that xi |= ¬¬pi and xi |̸= pi.
But this implies the existence of a world x′i > xi (since otherwise xi |= ¬pi and so xi |̸= ¬¬pi). Hence, we have a set
of non-maximal elements {x1, . . . , xn} with lower bound z. Since F is n-aCR, Y has also an upper bound x. There are two
possibilities. First, assume that there is a maximal element y ≥ x. Then y ≥ xi and y |= pi (because it is maximal and
xi |= ¬¬pi) for i = 1, . . . , n. But then we have a contradiction with y |= ¬i≤n pi. Now assume that there is no maximal
element greater than x. We know that for each i there exists yi ≥ x such that yi |= pi. By assumption, {y1, . . . , yn} is a set of
non-maximal elements with lower bound z and so, since the frame is n-aCR, this set has an upper bound y. Clearly y |= pi
for each i = 1, . . . , n and we again have a contradiction. 
Corollary 5.2. A frame F is aCR iff F validates W ′.
Now recall that an L-frame is a frame that validates all the theorems of L and hence, by the deduction theorem, also all
the rules of L.
Theorem 5.3. Let L be the implication–negation fragment of some intermediate logic L′. Then L is (hereditarily) structurally
complete iff all L-frames are aCR.
Proof. First observe thatwe can assume that L′ is axiomatized over IPC by formulas involving implication and negation only,
and thus byMcKay’s theorem [18], L′ is Kripke complete and so is L. By Theorem 3.7, L is (hereditarily) structurally complete
iffW ′ ⊆ L. But since L is Kripke complete,W ′ ⊆ L iff all L-frames validateW ′ iff, by Corollary 5.2, all L-frames are aCR. 
Our results allow us to determine (hereditary) structural completeness for the implication–negation fragments of many
well-studied intermediate logics. In particular, this fragment is hereditarily structurally complete for any Gödel logic (as
was already well-known; see, e.g., [4]). Also, De Morgan (Jankov) logic which like IPC has admissible underivable rules in
the full logic (and indeed shares a basis; see [10]) is hereditarily structurally complete for this fragment. On the other hand,
Gabbay–de Jongh logics (complete with respect to the class of finite trees in which every point has at most n+ 1 immediate
successors) and the logics of frames of depth at most n are not structurally complete in this fragment for n ≥ 2. Moreover,
we can prove the following general result:
Theorem 5.4. The implication–negation fragment of any intermediate logic with the disjunction property is not structurally
complete.
Proof. Suppose that L is the implication–negation fragment of an intermediate logic L′ with the disjunction property. If L is
structurally complete, then in particular (W ′2) is L-derivable. That is, (p1 → p2 → ⊥), ((¬¬p1 → p1) → q), ((¬¬p2 →
p2)→ q) ⊢L q. Hence, substituting (¬¬p1 → p1) ∨ (¬¬p2 → p2) for q and applying the deduction theorem,
⊢L′ ¬(p1 ∧ p2)→ ((¬¬p1 → p1) ∨ (¬¬p2 → p2)).
However, the independence of premises rule is admissible for any intermediate logic with the disjunction property [20].
Hence⊢L′ ¬(p1∧p2)→ (¬¬p1 → p1) or⊢L′ ¬(p1∧p2)→ (¬¬p2 → p2). So by substituting⊥ for p2 or p1,⊢L′ ¬¬p → p.
That is, L′ is classical logic, contradicting the disjunction property. 
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In particular, Medvedev logic (the logic of frames consisting of non-empty subsets of {1, . . . , n} dually ordered by inclusion)
is not structurally complete, unlike the logic in the full language which is structurally complete but not hereditarily
structurally complete [24].
Note finally that certain logicsmay require only a finite basis. In particular, for the implication–negation fragments of the
logics of frameswith atmost n nodes, the single rule (Wn) suffices. This raises then the question as towhether the admissible
rules of the implication–negation fragment of intuitionistic logic might also have a finite basis: the answer is no.
Theorem 5.5. The set of single-conclusion admissible rules of IPC→,¬ has no finite basis.
Proof. It is enough to show that for each n ≥ 2, the rules {(W ′i ) | 0 ≤ i ≤ n} do not form a basis (since any finite set of rules
provable in IPC+W ′ would be provable in IPC+ {(W ′i ) | 0 ≤ i ≤ n} for some n). From McKay’s theorem we know that the
logic L = IPC+ {(W ′i ) | 0 ≤ i ≤ n} is Kripke complete with respect to the class of all n-aCR Kripke frames. Moreover, there
exists an n-aCR frame which is not n+ 1-aCR. Hence (W ′n+1) is not derivable in L. 
6. Unification type
Let us briefly recall some standard definitions regarding the unification type of a logic, noting that for an algebraizable
logic such as L (a consistent axiomatic extension of the implication–negation fragment of IPC), these coincide with the
definitions for the corresponding class of algebras (see [1] for further details). Let Γ be a finite set of implication–negation
formulas and σ1, σ2 two L-unifiers for Γ . We define
σ1 ≤L σ2 iff there is a substitution σ such that σ2(p) = σ(σ1(p)) for all p ∈ Var(Γ ).
A complete set of L-unifiers for Γ is a set C of L-unifiers for Γ such that for any L-unifier σ for Γ , there exists σ ′ ∈ C such
that σ ′ ≤L σ . C is called minimal if additionally, for any σ1, σ2 ∈ C, if σ1 ≤L σ2, then σ1 = σ2. A substitution σ is called a
most general L-unifier of Γ iff {σ } is a (minimal) complete set of L-unifiers for Γ .
Γ is said to have unitary (finitary, infinitary) type iff it has a minimal complete set of L-unifiers of cardinality 1 (finite
cardinality, infinite cardinality), and type zero if it does not have a minimal complete set of L-unifiers. The unification type
of L is the maximal type of a finite set of implication–negation formulas according to the ordering unitary < finitary <
infinitary< zero.
Theorem 6.1. If L is strictly contained in classical logic, then L has finitary unification type.
Proof. We show first that L has unitary unification type if and only if it is classical logic (announced by Wroński in [29]).
The fact that classical logic has unitary unification type is well-known (see, e.g., [1]). We prove the converse. Consider the
formula p → (q → ⊥) and L-unifiers for this formula σ1, σ2 defined by σ1(p) = ⊥, σ1(q) = q, σ2(p) = p, σ2(q) = ⊥.
Suppose that L has unitary unification type. So there exists a most general unifier σ for p → (q → ⊥). But then, since
⊢L σp → (σq → ⊥), by the admissibility of the rule (W2), also ⊢L ¬¬σp → σp or ⊢L ¬¬σq → σq. Suppose without
loss of generality that ⊢L ¬¬σp → σp. Since σ is a most general unifier, σ2 = σ ′σ for some substitution σ ′. But then
⊢L ¬¬σ2(p)→ σ2(p); i.e. ⊢L ¬¬p → p. So L is classical logic.
To see that L has finitary unification type, letΓ be a finite set of implication–negation formulas. It suffices to find any finite
complete set of L-unifiers for Γ . We obtain first a finite set of simple formulasΠ such that Γ |∼L∆ iffΠ |∼L∆ (Lemma 3.2).
It follows that Γ |∼L ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Π andΠ |∼Lψ for allψ ∈ Γ . Hence a substitution σ is an L-unifier for Γ iff it is an L-unifier
for Π . Recall the finite set ΨΠ constructed in Section 3.2 and observe that it enjoys the following two properties (the first
follows by construction and the second from the proof of Lemma 3.4):
(1) Any L-unifier forΠ is an L-unifier for someΠ ′ ∈ ΨΠ .
(2) For eachΠ ′ ∈ ΨΠ , there exists an L-projective set ϕ⃗ such thatΠ ⊆ ϕ⃗ ⊆ Π ′.
Let C be the finite set of substitutions consisting of an L-projective unifier (and hence also a most general unifier) for each
ϕ⃗ identified in (2). We show that C is a complete set of L-unifiers for Γ . First note that each σ ∈ C is an L-unifier forΠ and
hence also for Γ . Now let σ be an L-unifier for Γ . Then σ is also an L-unifier forΠ and therefore, by (1), for someΠ ′ ∈ ΨΠ .
So σ is an L-unifier for the ϕ⃗ identified forΠ ′ in (2) and hence there exists σ ′ ∈ C such that σ ′ ≤L σ as required. 
Acknowledgements
We are grateful for the comments of an anonymous referee and also for the helpful remarks of Wojciech Dzik,
Rosalie Iemhoff, and Emil Jeřábek. The first author was partly supported by grant IAA900090703 of GA AV CR and partly
by Institutional Research Plan AVOZ10300504. The second author acknowledges support from Swiss National Science
Foundation grant 20002_129507.
References
[1] F. Baader, W. Snyder, Unification theory, in: Handbook of Automated Reasoning, Springer, 2001, pp. 445–532.
[2] A. Chagrov, M. Zakharyaschev, Modal Logic, Oxford University Press, 1996.
P. Cintula, G. Metcalfe / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 162 (2010) 162–171 171
[3] P. Cintula, Weakly implicative (fuzzy) logics I: Basic properties, Archive for Mathematical Logic 45 (2006) 673–704.
[4] P. Cintula, G. Metcalfe, Structural completeness in fuzzy logics, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 50 (2) (2009) 153–183.
[5] A.I. Citkin, On structurally complete superintuitionistic logics, Soviet Mathematics Doklady 19 (1978) 816–819.
[6] H.M. Friedman, One hundred and two problems in mathematical logic, Journal of Symbolic Logic 40 (2) (1975) 113–129.
[7] S. Ghilardi, Unification in intuitionistic logic, Journal of Symbolic Logic 64 (2) (1999) 859–880.
[8] S. Ghilardi, Best solving modal equations, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 102 (3) (2000) 184–198.
[9] R. Iemhoff, On the admissible rules of intuitionistic propositional logic, Journal of Symbolic Logic 66 (1) (2001) 281–294.
[10] R. Iemhoff, Intermediate logics and Visser’s rules, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 46 (1) (2005) 65–81.
[11] R. Iemhoff, G. Metcalfe, Proof theory for admissible rules, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 159 (1–2) (2009) 171–186.
[12] R. Iemhoff, G. Metcalfe, Hypersequent systems for the admissible rules of modal and intermediate logics, in: Proceedings of LFCS 2009, in: LNCS,
vol. 5407, Springer, 2009, pp. 230–245.
[13] E. Jeřábek, Admissible rules of modal logics, Journal of Logic and Computation 15 (4) (2005) 411–431.
[14] E. Jeřábek, Admissible rules of Łukasiewicz logic, Journal of Logic and Computation 20 (2) (2010) 425–447.
[15] E. Jeřábek, Bases of admissible rules of Łukasiewicz logic, Journal of Logic and Computation (in press).
[16] E. Jeřábek, Complexity of admissible rules, Archive for Mathematical Logic 46 (2) (2007) 73–92.
[17] P. Lorenzen, Einführung in die operative Logik und Mathematik, in: Grundlehren der mathematischen Wissenschaften, vol. 78, Springer, 1955.
[18] C.G. McKay, The decidability of certain intermediate propositional logics, Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (1968) 258–264.
[19] G. Metcalfe, Admissible rules of R-mingle (submitted for publication).
[20] P. Minari, A. Wroński, The property (HD) in intermediate logics. A partial solution of a problem of H. Ono, Reports on Mathematical Logic 22 (1988)
21–25.
[21] G. Mints, Derivability of admissible rules, in: Studies in Constructive Mathematics and Mathematical Logic. Part V, in: Zap. Nauchn. Sem. LOMI,
vol. 32, Nauka, Leningrad, 1972, pp. 85–89.
[22] J.S. Olson, J.G. Raftery, C.J.V. Alten, Structural completeness in substructural logics, Logic Journal of the IGPL 16 (5) (2008) 453–495.
[23] T. Prucnal, On the structural completeness of some pure implicational propositional calculi, Studia Logica 32 (1) (1973) 45–50.
[24] T. Prucnal, Structural completeness of Medvedev’s propositional calculus, Reports on Mathematical Logic 6 (1976) 103–105.
[25] P. Rozière, Regles admissibles en calcul propositionnel intuitionniste, Ph.D. Thesis, Université Paris VII, 1992.
[26] V. Rybakov, Admissibility of Logical Inference Rules, Elsevier, 1997.
[27] R. Statman, Intuitionistic propositional logic is polynomial-space complete, Theoretical Computer Science 72 (1979) 67–72.
[28] A. Wroński, On factoring by compact congruences in algebras of certain varieties related to the intuitionistic logic, Bulletin of the Section of Logic 15
(2) (1986) 48–51.
[29] A. Wroński, Transparent unification for equivalential algebras and some related varieties (abstract), Algebraic and Topological Methods in Non-
Classical Logics II (2005).
